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重庆市蔬菜基地管理条例

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重庆市蔬菜基地管理条例

重庆市人大常委会


重庆市蔬菜基地管理条例
重庆市人大常委会



(1998年3月28日重庆市第一届人民代表大会常务委员会第八次会议通过 1998年3月28日公布 1998年7月1日起施行)

第一章 总 则
第一条 为了加强对蔬菜基地的管理,发展蔬菜生产,满足城市蔬菜消费需求,根据《中华人民共和国农业法》、《中华人民共和国土地管理法》等有关法律、法规,结合本市实际,制定本条例。
第二条 本条例所称蔬菜基地是指经市和区、县(市)人民政府划定,常年从事商品蔬菜生产和蔬菜科研、良种繁育的耕地。
第三条 本市行政区域内蔬菜基地的规划、建设、保护和管理,应遵守本条例。
第四条 蔬菜基地管理,实行统筹规划、合理利用、严格保护、分级负责的原则。
第五条 市和区、县(市)人民政府蔬菜生产行政主管部门负责本行政区域内的蔬菜基地管理工作,土地管理、规划、财政、环保等部门按其职责分工、做好蔬菜基地管理的有关工作。
乡、镇人民政府应按照本条例有关规定,负责本行政区域内的蔬菜基地管理工作。
第六条 各级人民政府应加强对蔬菜基地管理工作的领导,把蔬菜基地的管理作为政府领导任期目标责任制的重要内容,对在蔬菜基地管理工作中做出突出成绩的单位和个人给予表彰和奖励。

第二章 规划布局
第七条 蔬菜基地的规划,必须符合土地利用总体规划、农业区划和城市规划,按照城郊为主和向适宜种植区域发展相结合的原则,稳定现有蔬菜基地,有计划地开发建设新菜地。
第八条 蔬菜基地规划由蔬菜生产行政主管部门会同土地管理、规划部门编制,报同级人民政府批准。
第九条 蔬菜基地划分为一类菜地和二类菜地。一类菜地应具备成片集中、交通方便、生产生态环境较好等基本条件,并以乡、镇或村、社为单位划定保护区加以保护。全市划入保护区蔬菜基地的面积不得低于蔬菜基地总面积的百分之七十。
新开发建设的蔬菜基地应划为一类菜地。
第十条 蔬菜基地的划定,由市和区、县(市)蔬菜生产行政主管部门会同土地管理部门和乡镇人民政府,按照蔬菜基地规划逐村逐社落实,并登记造册、建立档案后,将划定方案报同级人民政府批准。

第三章 开发建设
第十一条 蔬菜基地建设应因地制宜,突出重点,分级负责,有计划地进行。坚持保护改造老菜地和开发新菜地相结合,加强蔬菜基地基础设施的建设。
第十二条 蔬菜基地建设,包括道路交通、农田水利、土壤改良、土地整形、种苗基地、园艺设施、科研基地和服务体系建设等内容。
第十三条 多渠道增加对蔬菜基地建设的投入。各级人民政府应增加对蔬菜基地建设的投资;农村合作经济组织和农民应通过投资投劳、以工补农等形式增加对蔬菜基地的投入;鼓励其他单位和个人采取多种形式投资开发建设蔬菜基地。
第十四条 蔬菜基地建设和资金安排,由蔬菜生产行政主管部门会同财政部门,按年度制定蔬菜基地建设计划,报同级人民政府批准后执行。
第十五条 市的蔬菜基地建设项目,由市蔬菜生产行政主管部门按照市人民政府批准的年度计划负责审批。年度计划以外的,应专项报市人民政府审批。
区、县(市)投资的蔬菜基地建设项目,由区、县(市)人民政府审批,井报市蔬菜生产行政主管部门备案。
第十六条 蔬菜基地的开发建设,应实行项目管理责任制,分级分部门组织实施。

第四章 利用保护
第十七条 蔬菜基地必须用于蔬菜生产及相应的蔬菜科研与良种繁育,不得擅自改种其他作物或荒芜。
第十八条 承包者对其蔬菜基地的承包经营权,经发包方同意可以采取租赁、合作、入股、转让等方式转包给其他社会单位或个人从事蔬菜生产经营。
第十九条 蔬菜基地的各种设施和设备归投资者所有。属国家或者农村合作经济组织所有或者共有的,可以依法确定给集体或个人使用,落实管理责任,并按约定提取折旧费;使用蔬菜基地设施和设备的单位和个人,不得擅自改变用途,不得非法转让、出卖或私自拆除。
严禁盗窃、损坏蔬菜基地的设施和设备。
第二十条 保护蔬菜生产环境,防止污染蔬菜基地。任何单位和个人必须遵守下列规定:
(一)不准在蔬菜基地保护区内新建、扩建有污染的工程,对现有污染源应当限期治理;
(二)不准向蔬菜基地倾倒和排放有害的废渣、废水、废气等;
(三)不准施用国家禁止在菜地和蔬菜上使用的农药和其他化学物品。
环境保护部门和蔬菜生产行政主管部门应当按照职责分工,密切配合,加强对蔬菜基地环境的管理和监测。
第二十一条 禁止任何单位和个人非法占用、侵占、买卖或以其他形式非法转让蔬菜基地。
第二十二条 禁止在蔬菜基地内从事取土、采石等毁坏菜地的活动。

第五章 征用占用
第二十三条 严格控制征用和占用(以下简称征用)蔬菜基地。依法征用菜地应当遵循节约用地、征一补一的原则。
第二十四条 保护区内的蔬菜基地原则上不得征用。因国家重点建设需要征用保护区蔬菜基地的,规划部门应当会同蔬菜生产行政主管部门和土地管理部门选址定点,按照法定程序办理手续。
第二十五条 保护区内的乡村建设,不得占用蔬菜基地。符合用地条件的可以利用非耕地和劣地,并依法办理用地手续。
第二十六条 因城乡建设必须征用二类菜地的,规划和土地管理部门应在征得蔬菜生产行政主管部门同意后,按法定程序办理手续。
第二十七条 除以国家投资为主兴建的能源、交通、水利等建设项目,经国务院批准可以免缴新菜地开发建设基金外,依法征用蔬菜基地的单位或者个人,必须按规定缴纳新菜地开发建设基金,任何单位和个人不得批准免缴、减缴、缓缴。
未按规定缴纳新菜地开发建设基金的,土地管理部门不得办理用地手续和发给《建设用地许可证》,用地单位不得使用土地。
缴纳新菜地开发建设基金的不再缴纳基本农田造地费。
第二十八条 新菜地开发建设基金专项用于蔬菜基地的开发建设。新菜地开发建设基金征收,使用和管理的具体办法由市人民政府制定。
第二十九条 因征用蔬菜基地需要重建、迁建蔬菜基地的设施和设备的,由用地单位或个人负责重建或者迁建;也可以由用地单位或者个人给予一次性补偿。

第六章 奖励与处罚
第三十条 市和区、县(市)人民政府或蔬菜生产行政主管部门,对符合下列条件之一的单位和个人,应给予表彰奖励:
(一)积极贯彻实施本条例,对蔬菜基地的保护和管理工作做出显著成绩的;
(二)在蔬菜基地设施的建设、管理和维护工作中成绩显著的;
(三)检举揭发破坏、侵占蔬菜基地以及在征用蔬菜基地中弄虚做假和贪污、挪用菜地开发建设基金等行为的。
第三十一条 违反本条例的规定,有下列行为之一的,由区、县(市)蔬菜生产行政主管部门或乡、镇人民政府处理:
(一)蔬菜基地经营者擅自将蔬菜基地改种其他作物,荒芜蔬菜基地等,应责令其限期改正,恢复蔬菜生产。
(二)擅自改变属国家或农村合作经济组织所有的蔬菜基地设施、设备的用途,或非法转让、出卖、私自拆除的,责令恢复原状或者赔偿损失;情节严重的并处二千元以下罚款。
第三十二条 违反本条例第二十条规定的,由环境保护部门根据环境保护法律、法规处理。
第三十三条 违反本条例第二十一条、第二十二条规定的,由土地管理部门依法查处。
第三十四条 违反本条例第二十七条的规定,用地单位未按规定缴纳新菜地开发建设基金使用土地的,按应缴新菜地开发建设基金每日加收千分之二的滞纳金。
第三十五条 盗窃、破坏蔬菜基地设施和设备以及拒绝、阻碍国家工作人员依照本条例执行公务的,由公安机关依法查处;构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任。
第三十六条 国家工作人员违反本条例规定,有下列行为之一的,由其所在单位、监察机关或者上级机关给予行政处分;构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任:
(一)越权批准征用蔬菜基地的;
(二)为未缴清新菜地开发基金的单位办理用地手续的;
(三)违法批准免缴、减缴、缓缴新菜地开发基金的;
(四)截留、挪用新菜地开发基金的。
第三十七条 当事人对行政处罚不服的,可依法申请行政复议或者提起行政诉讼。超过法定期限不申请复议、不起诉又不履行的,由做出行政处罚决定的机关申请人民法院强制执行。

第七章 附 则
第三十八条 本条例具体应用中的问题,由重庆市农业局负责解释。
第三十九条 本条例自1998年7月1日起施行。



1998年3月28日

文化部办公厅关于开展2009—2010年度国家舞台艺术精品工程剧目申报工作的通知

文化部


文化部办公厅关于开展2009—2010年度国家舞台艺术精品工程剧目申报工作的通知

办艺函〔2010〕485号


各省、自治区、直辖市文化厅(局),新疆生产建设兵团文化广播电视局,总政宣传部艺术局,文化部直属艺术表演团体、中央有关部门所属艺术表演团体:

为全面贯彻党的十七大关于推动文化大发展大繁荣的战略部署,落实胡锦涛同志加强对艺术产品创作生产引导的讲话精神,创作生产更多无愧于时代、无愧于人民的文化精品,最大限度地发挥文化引导社会、教育人民、推动发展的功能,坚决抵制庸俗、低俗、媚俗之风,不断满足人民群众的精神文化需求,经研究决定,文化部将继续对国家舞台艺术精品工程投入专项资金,进一步扶持和资助舞台艺术精品的创作和生产。2009—2010年度国家舞台艺术精品工程剧目的申报、评审工作将继续进行。现将有关事项通知如下:

一、申报范围:

1. 申报作品包括大型作品与小型作品。

小型作品指戏曲小戏(非折子戏),话剧独幕剧(非小品),小歌剧、小音乐剧、小舞剧(非节目)等。曲艺、杂技、木偶、皮影等艺术门类照此原则办理。

2. 申报作品题材不限。

3. 首演时间与演出场次必须符合以下标准:

首演时间为2000年1月1日以后,歌剧、昆曲累计演出场次50场(含)以上,其它作品100场(含)以上。2009年以来新创作的特别优秀作品暂不受场次限制,但此类作品原则上不超过入选作品的10%。

4. 首演日期、演出收入和演出场次须经省级文化主管部门及纪检监察部门核准并分别签署意见。

二、申报程序及数量:

1. 本次申报面向全国各类所有制艺术院团,鼓励民营艺术院团、转企改制艺术院团以及社会力量举办的艺术院团申报。

2. 各级文化行政部门主办的艺术表演团体、其它部门主办的艺术表演团体以及民营、转制艺术院团,由所在省、自治区、直辖市文化厅(局)、新疆生产建设兵团文化局进行申报,申报数量不超过4台,可含有小型作品;

3. 部队、武警系统艺术团体由解放军总政治部宣传部申报,申报数量不超过6台,可含有小型作品;

4. 文化部直属艺术表演团体直接申报,每院(团)可申报作品1台(大小型作品均可);

5. 中央和国家有关部门所属艺术团体经主管部门同意后申报,每院(团)可申报作品1台(大小型作品均可);

6. 申报均请排出先后顺序。

三、申报材料:

1. 各省、自治区、直辖市文化厅(局)、总政宣传部艺术局等主管部门出具的推荐意见;

2. 创作演出单位填写《国家舞台艺术精品工程项目申报书》(见附件1),特别要说明剧目进一步修改加工的主要思路;

3. 申报作品激光视盘2份,彩色剧照(电子版)3—4张;

4. 戏剧类作品提供剧本2份,其它作品提供整体构思文字说明2份。

四、报送时间与地点

1. 申报日期:截止2010年11月10日,以当地邮戳为准,过期不予受理。

2. 申报地点:文化部艺术司艺术研究处(国家舞台艺术精品工程办公室)

地  址:北京市朝阳门北大街10号

邮政编码:100020

电  话:010-59881768(9) 

联 系 人:周汉萍、王 蒙         

参加申报的院团应认真填写申报材料,各省、自治区、直辖市文化厅(局)等文化行政部门要给予高度重视,严格把关,认真做好国家舞台艺术精品工程剧目的申报工作。

特此通知。



附件:《国家舞台艺术精品工程项目申报书》









二○一○年十月二十一日




附件:





国家舞台艺术精品工程项目申报书



















剧目名称      

艺术品种      

演出单位     

填表日期      







中华人民共和国文化部 




一、剧目基本情况

主要内容和艺术构想

剧目创意:本剧目创作的主要艺术追求和艺术特色、社会意义;首演时间、截止目前(2010年10月31日)的演出场次、演出收入和观众人数;预期社会效益和经济效益。




二、剧目修改加工主要思路 










































三、创作人员基本情况

主创人员
姓名
性别
民族
职称
年龄
主要艺术成就

编剧







导演

(编导)







作曲







舞美设计







主要演员







院团长







院团创作情况简介:


















四、已有经费主要来源和使用

本经费来源
项 目
金额(万元)
所占比例
备注

财政投入




社会资助




单位经费




其  它










经费支出


主创人员

劳 务 费




舞美服装灯光设计制作费




设备购置

租 赁 费




宣传费




其 他




省级文化

主管部门意见






  年 月 日
省级文化纪检监察部门意见






   年 月 日


五、创作演出单位情况

法定地址


邮政编码


法定代表人


联系人及联系方式


银行户名


开 户 行


账  号


单位申报意见













(单位盖章)



年 月 日





备注:因资助资金全部由财政部集中支付,以上资料填写务必清楚、准确、齐全(如工商银行帐号为19位)。
















































The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.